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Abstract
Regulatory capital requirements for securitizations are currently part of the
discussion regarding future changes to the regulation of nancial institutions
also known as Basel III. The merits of securitizations are generally excepted.
They are regarded as an additional source of funding and as a tool enabling
further dispersion of credit risk for nancial institutions. However, structured
products are considered as an essential contributor or at least an amplier to
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The inadequate risk evaluation of securi-
tizations by rating agencies and market participants are the main cause for
enormous investor losses and institution failures.
This cumulative thesis is mainly focussing on the theoretical and empirical
analysis of the adequacy of the regulatory capital requirements for securiti-
zations. At rst an overview of the existing approaches for securitizations is
provided including an analysis of the functioning of the approaches (Ratings-
Based Approach and Supervisory Formula Approach for IRB-Banks).
Thereafter, this cumulative thesis addresses the issue of capital volatility
for securitizations along the economic cycle. By using comprehensive Monte-
Carlo-Simulations regulatory capital requirements of credit portfolios on the
one hand and asset portfolio securitizations on the other are compared with
regard to potential levels of cyclicality. It turns out, that the cyclicality of
capital requirements for asset portfolio securitizations is considerably higher
resulting in a further worsening of economic downturns during a crisis. In
addition, it is shown that the cyclicality of capital requirements is higher for
the Ratings-Based Approach (RBA) compared to the Supervisory Formula
Approach (SFA) in particular if a point-in-time rating methodology is applied.
Then, this cumulative thesis investigates whether current regulatory rules
suciently account for systematic risk. Based on a comprehensive empirical
dataset, a framework to measure the risk exposure of securitizations is devel-
oped. Afterwards, the ratings-based capital requirements are determined and
it is analyzed whether current rules reect this exposure to systematic risk. As
a result it is demonstrated that capital charges for tranches with the highest
rating are insucient under the current RBA. Accordingly, a new calibration
of risk weights is proposed.
Finally, this cumulative thesis addresses the question whether rating agen-
cies loosened their rating standards for mortgage-backed securities in the years
prior to the crisis as assumed by many market participants due to the known
rating phenomena such as `rating shopping' and `rating ination'. Using em-
pirical data, time series dynamics of ratings are analyzed and it is examined
whether investors incorporate their knowledge regarding possible changes in
the rating standard into tranche pricing. The ndings provide no evidence
that rating agencies have loosened their rating standards prior to the crisis.
As a general conclusion of this thesis it is conrmed, that current regulatory
capital requirements for securitizations are insucient and a revision of the
current regulation framework appears essential.
Keywords: Securitizations, Regulatory capital, Rating
Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen der geplanten Neuregelungen zu Basel III werden u.a. umfang-
reiche Änderungen der regulatorischen Ansätze für Verbriefungstransaktionen
diskutiert. Kreditverbriefungen stellen bedeutende Instrumente zur Renan-
zierung und Risikodiversikation von Kreditinstituten dar. Strukturierte Pro-
dukte gelten aber auch als maÿgeblicher Auslöser und Verstärker der globalen
Finanzkrise. Die Fehleinschätzung von Verbriefungsrisiken durch Marktteil-
nehmer und Ratingagenturen führte zu erheblichen Verlusten bei Investoren
und zu Schieagen von Kreditinstituten.
Kernpunkt dieser kumulativen Dissertation ist die theoretische und empi-
rische Analyse der Angemessenheit von regulatorischen Kapitalanforderungen
für Verbriefungen. Zunächst werden die geltenden regulatorischen Ansätze für
Verbriefungen (Ratings-Based Approach und Supervisory Formula Approach
für IRB Banken) vorgestellt und analysiert.
Die kumulative Dissertation befasst sich dann mit dem Thema der Volati-
lität von Kapitalanforderungen für Verbriefungen im Konjunkturzyklus. Mit
Hilfe von umfangreichen Monte-Carlo Simulationen werden die regulatorischen
Kapitalanforderungen von Kreditportfolien und Verbreifungsportfolien in Be-
zug auf konjunkturabhängige Schwankungen verglichen. Es stellt sich heraus,
dass die Kapitalanforderungen für Verbriefungsportfolien eine deutlich höhe-
re Volatilität aufweisen und damit in Krisenzeiten den wirtschaftlichen Ab-
schwung noch weiter verschärfen. Zudem erweist sich der Ratings-Based Ap-
proach (RBA) gegenüber dem Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA) als deut-
lich volatiler insbesondere für eine Point-in-Time Ratingmethodik.
Die kumulative Dissertation untersucht dann, ob die geltenden regulatori-
schen Ansätze dem systematischen Risiko von Verbriefungstransaktionen Rech-
nung tragen. Anhand eines umfangreichen empirischen Datensatzes wird zu-
nächst ein Modell zur Messung des Risikos von Verbriefungen entwickelt. An-
schlieÿend wird untersucht ob die rating-basierten Kapitalanforderungen das
ermittelte systematische Risiko hinreichend abdecken. Es ist festzustellen, dass
der geltende RBA Ansatz zu unzureichenden Kapitalanforderungen bei den
höher gerateten Tranchen führt. Infolgedessen wird eine Neukalibrierung der
Risikogewichte im RBA vorgeschlagen unter Einbeziehung der systematischen
Risikosensitivität von Verbriefungen.
Abschlieÿend widmet sich die kumulative Dissertation noch der Frage, ob
Ratingagenturen beim Rating für Verbriefungen von Hypothekenkrediten in
der Zeit vor der Finanzkrise ihre Ratingstandards gelockert haben, was von
vielen Markteilnehmern auf Grund von Fehlanreizen der Ratingagenturen oft-
mals vermutet wurde. Anhand empirischer Daten wird untersucht ob sich der
Ratingstandard verändert hat und ob Investoren dies ggf. bei den Bepreisun-
gen von Tranchen berücksichtigt haben. Im Ergebnis lässt sich kein Nachweis
für eine Lockerung der Ratingstandards feststellen.
Die Ergebnisse der Dissertation bestätigen, dass die bestehenden regulatori-
schen Anforderungen für die Kapitalhinterlegung von Verbreifungstransaktio-
nen nicht ausreichend sind und einer Überarbeitung bzw. Neufassung bedürfen.
Schlagwörter: Verbriefungen, Regulatorische Kapitalanforderungen, Rating
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1.1 Securitizations and Capital Regulation
Securitization is a special nancial instrument for a company or a nancial
institution to restructure the asset risks of their portfolios and to sell these
partially or completely to investors. Income producing assets like e.g. com-
mercial and residential mortgages, private loans, car loans, investment credits
or credit card debt obligations are pooled into a reference portfolio and the
pooled assets are transformed into tradable securities with dierent levels of
seniority and thereafter sold to the money- and capital markets. The investors
in these structured nance securities obtain a claim on future collateralized
cash ows generated by the underlying pool of debt assets (see, e.g., Perraudin
(2006), Franke & Krahnen (2008), Hull (2009), among others).
The company or nancial institution that owns the original assets is called
originator. The originator sells the pooled assets outright to the issuer (`true
sale securitization'), an entity which is usually set up as a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) just to purchase the assets and to sell the securities after secu-
ritization. Sometimes the originator sells only the credit risk inherent to the
assets instead of the legal asset claim (`synthetic securitization') to the issuer
and nally to the money- and capital markets (see e.g., Bluhm & Wagner
(2011)).
Securitization started in the 1970s with pooled home mortgages in the U.S
(see Crouhy et al. (2008)). Since then the market has grown drastically not
only in the U.S. but also in all other major markets worldwide. The increas-
ing number of nancial institutions which employ securitization is due to a
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variety of reasons. Basically securitization is considered as a tool to reinforce
the liquidity currently tied in debt assets and it is often less expensive to
raise money through securitizations rather than through the underlying pool
of individual assets. Furthermore asset securitization oers an opportunity to
transfer credit risks to the balance sheets respectively prot and loss state-
ments of other companies or nancial institutions. Finally, securitization may
be employed in order to reduce regulatory capital requirements.
In principle securitizations were accepted as to generate economic benets
like dispersing risk concentration. However, structured nancial instruments
are subject of a controversial discussion since they were identied as a major
contributor to credit losses in the Global Financial Crises (GFC) (see, e.g.,
Longsta (2010)). This has triggered a broad discussion regarding the ade-
quacy of regulatory capital requirements for securitizations (see, e.g., Hamerle
et al. (2011)). Capital requirements for structured products under Basel II al-
low two dierent approaches to allocate capital to securitization transactions.
The Ratings-based Approach (RBA) and the Supervisory Formula Appraoch
(SFA). The RBA has been developed in order to establish a clear and simple
industry standard comprising elementary risk wights at the level of external
(or inferred) credit rating grades for individual tranches. As long as these
ratings are available this approach is mandatory. The SFA determines the
capital required for securitized tranches on the basis of parameters provided
by the bank. These parameters are related to pool characteristics and tranche
properties. In 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has already
introduced a few enhancements to the existing Basel Framework as a response
to the large losses of these assets during the GFC (see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2009)).
These enhancements were incorporated primarily to encounter the evident
failures of resecuritizations. However, in order to address all deciencies iden-
tied during the GFC, the question whether the RBA or alternatively the
SFA ensures that sucient capital is provided to cover the risk of securitized
transactions has been discussed extensively further on (e.g., Rösch & Scheule
(2012)). Beyond this, in December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012) announced that it
was planning a comprehensive review of the securitization framework, particu-
larly addressing the dependence of securitized transactions on external ratings.
Actually, the fact-ndings after the GFC suggest that the evaluation meth-
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ods from external rating agencies were insucient regarding structured nance
products as the eective loss ratios of numerous securitized exposures were sig-
nicantly higher than rating agencies had expected. Furthermore, the ability
of investors to monitor the risk inherent to structured instruments seems to
be rather limited due to the complex structure of some securitized products
and in particular in the case of resecuritizations. Additionally, originators may
have been encouraged to cut back on regular monitoring activities after the
risk has disappeared from their balance sheets. As a consequence, securitiza-
tion markets seem to be exceptionally vulnerable to a deterioration of credit
scoring and credit signing standards. Other investigations demonstrate that
securitized products are more sensitive to macroeconomic risk factors then
the underlying pool of assets which was not adequately considered in external
credit ratings for these asset classes (compare e.g., Clauÿen et al. (2014)). In
this respect, the risk of procyclical eects of regulatory capital requirements
seem to be even more severe in the area of securitization.
This cumulative thesis provides a detailed insight into current regulatory
capital approaches for securitizations. Potential revisions of the regulatory
rules after the experiences of the GFC are systematically analyzed and dis-
cussed.
Based on Monte Carlo Simulations evidence is provided that securitized
transactions are highly sensitive to systematic risk. It is shown that the sys-
tematic risk sensitivity of securitized tranches enhances the amplitude of regu-
latory capital volatility. Accordingly, the challenges for regulators are discussed
and potential approaches to deal with cyclicality are presented.
Due to these ndings, a special framework to measure the real exposure to
systematic risk for pools of asset securitizations is developed. This framework
is utilized to calibrate new risk weights which account more accurately for
systematic risk especially in economic downturns.
As already mentioned, the GFC has unfolded major issues associated with
securitized exposures. Massive defaults were experienced and some securitiza-
tion markets (in particular the risky U.S. subprime mortgage market) suered
from unexpected large and persisting deteriorations in the quality of the un-
derlying assets and caused numerous downgrades of securitizations and huge
unexpected losses for the investors. The decision of potential investors to put
money in securitized products was mainly supported by the risk assessment of
the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). Due to the high default rates of securitiza-
3
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tions during the GFC, CRAs were suspected of being too optimistic in assigning
ratings for structured products. However, the rating agencies argue that the
poor performance was a result of the unexpected macroeconomic shocks which
were unpredictable by any other market participant (compare e.g., Moody's
Investors Service (2007)). In the light of this discussion, the cumulative thesis
substantiates rating standard dynamics for Mortgage-backed Securities (MBS)
prior to the GCF. Furthermore it is demonstrated that changes in the rating
standards impact investors' pricing decisions.
In conclusion this thesis targets
 a better understanding of the theoretical foundation, the functionality
and the major issues of the regulatory capital approaches for securitiza-
tions,
 the recognition of strong cyclical eects related to securitized portfolios
and potential mitigation mechanisms,
 the appropriateness of regulatory risk weights for securitizations (RBA)
in consideration of systematic risk, providing sucient capital charges
along the economic cycles and
 the identication of time-series dynamics in rating standards for MBS
and the impact on tranche pricing.
The ndings and proposals presented in this thesis may contribute to gain
more condence in a sucient and sustainable capital coverage for structured
nance products. Thus, the results from the empirical and simulation based
investigations and the conclusions are addressed to several groups, e.g., other
researchers in the eld of securitization transactions, investors in securitized
tranches, risk managers in banks and regulatory authorities respectively policy
makers.
1.2 Outline and Contributions
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows.
In Chapter 2, the regulatory rules to determine capital requirements for
structured products under Basel II are considered. Therefore the set of dif-
ferent approaches to calculate the capital charges for securitized exposures
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are systemically described. Furthermore the main objectives of regulators are
reviewed, the theoretical model foundations are explained and the nancial
engineering behind the regulatory capital approaches are discussed. In addi-
tion, the eects of variations of the essential parameters used in the models
are explained. Besides it is shown that the approaches may provide insucient
capital during economic downturns such as the GFC. Therefore the changes
which have already been implemented in the regulatory framework after the
experiences of the GFC are described and nally further potential revisions of
the regulatory rules in relation to Basel III are discussed.
In Chapter 3, the level and cyclicality of regulatory bank capital for asset
portfolio securitizations in relation to the cyclicality of capital requirements
for the underlying loan portfolio as under Basel II/III is analyzed. A com-
prehensive simulation approach is developed and four re-investment rules, two
securitization regimes, two approaches to calculate regulatory capital and two
rating methodologies are analyzed. In addition, the analysis of an empirical
dataset provides feedback on the rating methodology preferred in practice and
the adequacy of current capital requirements. The most important ndings
of this chapter are as follows: Firstly, cyclicality of capital requirements is
higher for i) asset portfolio securitizations relative to primary loan portfolios,
ii) the Ratings Based Approach relative to the Supervisory Formula Approach,
iii) given the RBA for a point-in-time rating methodology relative to a rate-
and-forget rating methodology, and iv) under the passive reinvestment rule
relative to alternative rules. Secondly, the analysis with regard to the capital
requirements of the individual tranches reveal that the volatility of aggregated
capital charges for the securitized portfolio is triggered by the most senior
tranches. This is due to the fact that senior tranches are more sensitive to the
macroeconomy. Thirdly, the empirical analysis provides evidence that current
credit ratings are time-constant and that economic losses for securitizations
have exceeded the required capital in the GFC.
In Chapter 4, a framework to measure the exposure to systematic risk for
pools of asset securitizations is developed. In addition it is empirically mea-
sured whether current ratings-based rules for regulatory capital of securitiza-
tions under Basel II and Basel III reect this exposure. The analysis is based
on a comprehensive US dataset on asset securitizations for the time period be-
tween 2000 and 2008. The results show that the shortfall of regulatory capital
during the GFC is strongly related to ratings. In particular, it is empirically
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veried that insucient capital is allocated to tranches with the highest rat-
ing. These tranches account for the greatest part of the total issuance volumes.
Furthermore, the approach is the rst to calibrate risk weights which account
for systematic risk and provide sucient capital buers to cover the exposure
during similar economic downturns. These policy-relevant ndings suggest a
re-calibration of RBA risk weights and may contribute to the current eorts
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others to re-establish
sustainable securitization markets and to improve the stability of the nancial
system.
In Chapter 5, rating standards that credit rating agencies applied to mortgage-
backed securities from 2001 to 2010 are analyzed. The ndings suggest that a
divergent pattern exists between home equity loans and residential mortgage-
backed securities. Rating agencies tightened their standards for home equity
loans, while holding their standards for residential mortgage-backed securities
rather constant over time. It is shown that the dynamics are the same for
rating standards at origination and rating standards during monitoring years.
The ndings are robust after controlling for systematic risk. Furthermore, the
results suggest that investors are aware of the dynamics of rating standards
and incorporate their knowledge into tranche prices. Tighter rating standards
are associated with lower yield spreads. This may be an indication that the
mortgage burst came suddenly and was unexpected because otherwise lower
yield spreads would not have been justied.
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In the years prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) a large demand for
mortgage-backed securities could be observed in all nancial markets, partic-
ularly the US. The decision of potential investors to put money in securitzed
products was mainly supported by the risk assessment of the Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs). Due to the massive defaults and downgrades of securi-
tizations during the GFC, the role of the rating agencies has been broadly
discussed. The rating practice of the CRAs is subject to a sharp criticism re-
garding its inadequate capability in assessing the real risk of securitized prod-
ucts.
However, the rating agencies argue, that the poor performance of securitzed
products in general, mirrors the unexpected macroeconomic shocks which were
unpredictable by any market participant. In particular, they refer to the un-
precedented declines in home prices and to the sharp cutback in mortgage
credit supply in the MBS market. CRAs also claried that early warnings
were provided prior to the crisis about increasing levels of risk. In July 2003,
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Moody's started to report a deterioration in origination standards and inated
housing prices in their reports (Moody's Investors Service (2007)). According
to Michael Kanef, Managing Director of Moody's, the rating agency published
an extraordinary report in 2007 highlighting the increasing defaults of sub-
prime mortgages originated in the year before. Moody's also stated that in
response to the observed increase of riskiness in the subprime market their
rating criteria were tightened. In the period between 2003 and 2006 the loss
expectations and enhancement levels increased by about 30% according to
Kanef.
The criticism that rating agencies systematically relaxed their rating stan-
dards prior to the crisis is a widespread assumption to explain the basic reasons
for the GFC. However, so far there is no empirical study to verify the statement
of the rating agencies that rating criteria were tightened in the years prior to
the crisis.
We are the rst to identify time-series dynamics in rating standards and to
prove that rating agencies actually tightened their standards  at least to a
certain extent. Moreover, we are the rst to show that investors realized the
changes in the rating standards and that their knowledge was incorporated
into the pricing of tranches, partially thwarting the intentions of the rating
agencies.
5.1.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to four streams in the literature. The rst stream focuses on
the rating standard of corporate bonds. Blume et al. (1998) apply an ordered
probit model in order to empirically investigate whether changing rating stan-
dards may explain the downgrades in US corporate bond ratings. Their study
conrms that rating standards indeed became more stringent in the period
between 1978 and 1995.1 Using the same methodology, Alp (2013) analyzes
the time series variation in corporate credit rating standards for investment-
grade and speculative-grade ratings from 1985 to 2007. The study reveals
that investment-grade rating standards tightened and speculative-grade rat-
ing standards loosened from 1985-2002. The investigation detects a structural
shift towards more stringent ratings in 2002. Baghai et al. (2013) conrm in
1 This trend is conrmed more recently by Amato & Furne (2004) for macroeconomic
conditions. In addition, Jorion et al. (2009) link the tightening of rating standards to a
deterioration of accounting quality.
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their investigation that rating agencies became more conservative in assessing
credit risk of corporate bonds over the time period 1985-2009. Wang (2012)
analyzes whether reputation concerns may impact rating agencies and con-
sequently their rating standards. The results of the empirical study suggest
that reputational concerns are not strong enough to support self-disciplining
mechanisms. Furthermore, the author nds an asymmetric eect of the busi-
ness cycle on rating standards providing evidence, that ratings are inated
during recessions. On the other side, there is almost no indication that CRAs
deate ratings during economic upturns. Other authors nd both empirically
and theoretically, that rating standards have declined due to competition with
the entry of CRA Fitch into the market. Examples are Becker & Milbourn
(2009), Camanho et al. (2010) and Bar-Isaac & Shapiro (2013). Bae et al.
(2010) compare the two claims applying a dierent set of control variables and
nd that neither hypothesis  tightening and loosening rating standard  can
be conrmed when controlling for the slow adjustment of ratings over time.
A vibrant literature exists regarding the information content of ratings for
corporate bond issuers and issues. Radelet & Sachs (1998) nd that rating
changes are pro-cyclical. This suggests that rating changes provide only a
limited amount of new information to the market. Ederington & Goh (1993),
Dichev & Piotroski (2001) and Purda (2007) nd that corporate credit rating
downgrades provide news to the market. Löer (2004) nds that the default
prediction power of ratings is low. Poon et al. (2009) analyze solicited and
unsolicited bank credit ratings and show that solicitation is a signicant ex-
planatory variable between both groups. The relative roles of dierent CRAs
have also been studied. For example, Morgan (2002) examines the eect of
divergent Moody's and S&P's ratings of banks and Becker & Milbourn (2011)
analyze the link between information eciency of ratings and competition af-
ter the market entry of CRA Fitch. Güttler & Wahrenburg (2007) nd that
bond ratings by Moody's and Standard & Poor's are highly correlated and
Livingston et al. (2010) nd that the impact of Moody's ratings on market
reactions is stronger compared to Standard & Poor's.
The second stream analyzes the rating standard of securitization. First
contributions nd a deterioration of rating standards prior to the GFC driven
by the tremendous growth of the market and earnings of CRA. Mathis et al.
(2009) show in a theoretical model that CRAs always inate ratings if the frac-
tion of CRA revenues coming from the rating of complex products becomes the
12
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most important source of income. White (2010) states that the downgrade g-
ures of originally Aaa-rated mortgage-backed securities are a strong indicator
for an widely overoptimism for securities that were issued and rated in 2005-
2007. Stanton & Wallace (2010) show that rating standards have declined over
time for commercial mortgage-backed securities due to falling subordination
levels between 1996 and 2007. He et al. (2011) nd in their empirical study
that rating agencies inate ratings for larger issuers. Our paper extends this
study as it i) controls for the quality of the underlying mortgage portfolio
as well as credit enhancement approaches2, ii) analyzes ratings at origination
and monitoring years and iii) compares rating standards over time. Ashcraft
et al. (2009) empirically study variations in credit ratings for subprime and
Alt-A mortgage securitizations issued between 2001-2007. Due to their results
ratings became less conservative prior to the GFC.
The third stream focusses on mortgage markets and the mortgage default
crisis. Dell'Ariccia et al. (2012) explain reasons for the deterioration in lend-
ing standards on mortgage markets: i) credit booms and growth episodes ii)
continuing housing boom and the belief in a fast rate of house price apprecia-
tion iii) change in market structure with new aggressive institutions entering
the market and iv) disintermediation. Bajari et al. (2008) provide evidence
that existing pricing models underestimated the degree of nondiversiable risk
e.g., the high geographic correlation of declining housing prices and defaults,
impairing the proper functioning of capital markets. Moreover they also nd
a deterioration in the loan quality leading to increased mortgage default rates.
Krainer et al. (2009) attribute the high mortgage default rates to the realiza-
tion of extreme house price shocks rather than to a mispricing of mortgages.
Rajan et al. (2013) demonstrate that within the securitization process there
is also a loss of information. As a consequence, the authors show that during
high securitization regimes interest rates on loans become a poor predictor of
the tranches' default likelihood because soft information of borrowers' credit-
worthiness is neglected. Micu et al. (2009) conduct a zip code analysis and
nd that the origin of the mortgage default crisis comes from the expansion of
2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) denes: `A credit enhancement is a
contractual arrangement in which the bank retains or assumes a securitization exposure
and, in substance, provides some degree of added protection to other parties to the trans-
action.' Please note that Grin & Tang (2012) analyze the credit enhancement features
over-collateralization, liquidity, and insurance and nd that these features are not critical
considerations in CRA models.
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mortgage credit supply to subprime neighborhoods across the USA and like-
wise the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages. The authors nd
a negative correlation of income for these subprime neighborhoods and mort-
gage credit growth for the time period between 2002 and 2005.3 Gerardi et al.
(2007) analyze the role of house price appreciation in generating foreclosures
in Massachusetts for the time period 1989 to 2007. The authors attribute the
dramatic rise of foreclosures in 2006/2007 to the decline in house prices that
started in the middle of 2005. Agarwal et al. (2011) show that securitization
reduces the chance of a mortgage renegotiation and increases the likelihood for
a foreclosure.
Strategic default in relation to negative equity is a particular phenomenon
in the world of residential and commercial mortgages. Borrowers may decide
to stop their amortization payments even if their nancial position would allow
further payments. Such cases are quite typical after a substantial drop in house
prices in particular if the debt owed exceeds the value of the property. In several
US states mortgage loans are non-recourse debt. A non-recourse debt does not
allow the lender to pursue claims against the debtor other than the collateral.
The lender may only exploit the house while the borrower can simply `walk
away' without any further suerings from the defaulted mortgage. Several
authors are dealing with this particular issue of strategic mortgage default,
e.g., Guiso et al. (2009) investigate moral and social considerations related
to strategic default in the US. The authors state that about 30% of existing
defaults are strategic. The borrower's decision to default strongly depends on
the eective equity shortfall e.g., about 17% of American households would
strategically default when the equity shortfall reaches 50% of the value of their
house. Conversely, no household would default if the equity shortfall is less
than 10%. Furthermore, Guiso et al. (2013) examine the role of non-pecuniary
factors on the borrowers' decision to default strategically. The authors nd
a social contagion eect for strategic default decisions in areas with a high
proportion of foreclosures. Ghent & Kudlyak (2011) compare the eects of
lender recourse and non-recourse on mortgage defaults in the US. The authors
state that borrowers are more likely to default in non-recourse states.
3 Note that von Furstenberg & Green (1974), Genesove &Mayer (1997), Ambrose & Capone
(2000), Deng et al. (2000), Pennington-Cross (2003), Ruckes (2004), Ambrose et al.
(2005), Dell'Ariccia & Marquez (2006), Pennington-Cross & Chomsisengphet (2007), De-
myanyk & Van Hemert (2011) and Demyanyk et al. (2011) provide excellent studies on
the risk drivers of individual mortgages.
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The fourth stream is related to ratings and spread pricing. Cuchra (2005)
underlines the importance of credit ratings for European securitizations as
a key driver for spread pricing at date of issue. Adelino (2009) investigates
the pricing of residential mortgage-backed securities tranches at origination.
He demonstrates that investors in tranches rated below Aaa do not solely
rely on ratings. Yield spreads for these tranches have predictive power for
future tranche performance. At the same time, the author shows that yield
spreads of Aaa-rated tranches have only low predictive power. Investors in
these instruments have less information about the quality of their product in
comparison to investors in much riskier securitized tranches. He et al. (2012)
investigate the impact of the issuer size on yield spreads of mortgage-backed
securities. The authors nd that the initial yield spreads are higher for MBS
tranches of large issuers than of small issuers during booming periods. This
nding suggests that investors are taking into account that large issuers receive
more inated ratings than small issuers. This nding may also imply that
rating standard changes have a limited contribution to the GFC.
5.1.3 Contributions
In order to examine the question as to whether rating agencies systematically
relaxed their rating standards prior to the crisis we aim to identify time series-
dynamics in rating standards using a narrow denition of tighter  respectively
looser  rating standards. In general, the rating of a tranche relies on the spe-
cic risk prole of the tranche. The risk prole is primarily determined by
the risk of the underlying mortgage pool and by the securitization character-
istics such as subordination and thickness of tranches. A tranche maintaining
a specic risk prole may today achieve a worse (better) rating compared to
a tranche maintaining the same risk prole at a previous year. Worse ratings
insinuate a tightening whereas better ratings indicate a loosening in rating
standards.
Building on the analysis of Blume et al. (1998) for US corporate bond rat-
ings, we use an ordered probit analysis of a panel of tranches from 2001-2007
for ratings at origination and from 2001-2009 for ratings at observation. We
address the critique by Bae et al. (2010) that rating standard tests need to
control for the slow adjustment of ratings over time. Therefore we stratify the
data into origination and monitoring years avoiding such an impediment on the
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origination year results. The origination year is dened as the year in which
the transaction was closed and the tranche was rst rated. Monitoring years
are the years between origination and maturity of a securitization. We amend
the second stream in literature by analyzing all ratings (i.e., all tranches) of
a securitization.4 Moreover, we extend the related literature including indica-
tors of strategic default in our analysis. Strategic default has been identied by
various contributions as the main driver of mortgage default. In our investiga-
tion we distinguish between the two asset classes: residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and home equity loans (HEL). RMBS are generally backed
by prime or Alt-A quality rst-lien residential mortgages. HEL securities are
backed by sub-prime mortgage loans, home improvement loans, high loan-to-
value loans, home equity lines of credit, second-lien loans and net interest
margin securitizations (compare Moody's Investors Service 2009a).
A further contribution of our paper is to analyze whether investors have
realized any changes in the rating standard and whether this knowledge is
incorporated in the pricing of tranches. We extend the approach used by He
et al. (2012) and analyze the impact (via regression) from potential changes
in rating standards on the yield spread at origination and at observation.
The yield spread at origination is dened as the dierence between the initial
coupon rate and the yield of a corresponding Treasury security whose maturity
is closest to the tranche's weighted average life. We calculate the yield spread at
observation by reverse-engineering, the maturity from the initial yield spread,
the current market price and the current risk-free rate.
We nd that rating agencies tightened their standards for HEL while holding
their standards for RMBS rather constant over time. The identied dynamics
are the same for rating standards at origination and rating standards dur-
ing monitoring years. Accordingly, we conrm that rating agencies actually
applied tighter rating criteria for home equity loans prior to the crisis. Our
ndings are robust for dierent sets of control variables and also hold after
controlling for systematic risk. Furthermore, we nd evidence that investors
are aware of changes in rating standards and that they incorporate this knowl-
edge in pricing of tranches. Tighter ratings standards are associated with
lower yield spreads, indicating that investors perceived the tightening as not
completely justied.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 species the applied
4 Ashcraft et al. (2009) analyze Aaa subordination levels only.
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research methodology and illustrates the dataset of asset securitizations used in
the empirical study. Section 5.3 describes the empirical tests and the control
variables used in the analysis. Section 5.4 presents the results according to
the hypotheses (Section 5.2) and explains the impact from dierent rating




Rating standard changes may be linked to origination ratings (i.e., the rst
time a rating is assigned) and monitoring ratings (i.e., when ratings are revis-
ited). We analyze these ratings for vintage eects, the economic environment,
time since origination (TSO) and time to maturity as well as trends.
As described in Section 5.1.1, we aim to identify time-series dynamics in
rating standards, in order to nd out whether the widespread criticism that
rating agencies have systematically relaxed their ratings standards prior to the
crisis is justied, or whether we nd evidence for a move towards more stringent
rating standards due to numerous announcements of major representative of
the CRAs. The analysis is based on a dataset on US mortgage securitization
transactions for the time period 2001-2009. The hypotheses are:
Rating Standard Hypothesis (H1): CRA rating standards at origination
(H1a) and during monitoring years (H1b) do not change over time.
If these hypotheses are rejected, evidence is given that there are signicant
time-series variations in rating standards at origination or/and during moni-
toring years. If these variations tend to move signicantly in one direction over
the observed time period rather than to uctuate widely, it can be assumed
that rating criteria were either tightened or loosened.
In addition, we test if possible changes in CRA rating standards are per-
ceived by the investors. The hypotheses are:
Investor Awareness Hypothesis (H2): Investors do not realize dierent credit
rating standards at origination (H2a) and during monitoring years (H2b).
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If these hypotheses are rejected, investors are aware of the rating standard
dynamics applied by the major CRAs. We show that these hypotheses are
rejected for home equity loans at origination and during monitoring years.
Builing on these results, we analyze whether this knowledge is incorporated in
the yield spread pricing of the investors.
5.2.2 Data
In our analysis we use a dataset of HEL and RMBS deals issued between 2001
and 2007 (and observed between 2001 to 2009) provided by Moody's credit
rating agency on a quarterly basis. This sample includes the initial character-
istics of the tranches such as the subordination level, thicknesses of tranches,
issuance volumes and the rating of tranches. From Bloomberg we draw char-
acteristics of the underlying assets including among others the borrower credit
score (FICO) and the loan-to-value-ratio (LTV).
We convert the rating data from Moody's (Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, A3,..., B1, B2,
B3, Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, C) into numerical equivalents and merge the rating
classes into ve rating categories for HEL (from category 1-5: Aaa, Aa1-Aa3,
A1-A3, Baa1-Baa3, Ba1-Ba3 and worse) and six rating categories for RMBS
(Aaa, Aa1-Aa3, A1-A3, Baa1-Baa3, Ba1-Ba3, B1-B3 and worse). After the
consolidation of the Moody's data and the Bloomberg dataset the sample com-
prises 156,197 tranches at origination in total. Table 5.1 displays the total
number of rated tranches and the percentage by rating category for each quar-
ter of the given time period for home equity loans (Panel A) and residential




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRAs assign ordinal ratings to securitization tranches.5 We face the follow-
ing challenges in analyzing the rating standards: i) the modeling of ordinal
ratings requires the use of a non-linear model for ordinary responses and ii)
one transaction generally comprises multiple tranches and therefore ratings
which requires a controlling for the clustering of transactions. Following the
lead by Blume et al. (1998), we model the rating of a tranche as a function of
the tranches' risk proles and year indicators. We assume a latent continuous
variable Y ∗it linking the tranches' risk prole to the following rating categories
Rit:
Y ∗it = αt + β
′Xit + εit (5.1)
Rit =

1 if Y ∗it ∈ (−∞, θ1)
2 if Y ∗it ∈ [θ1, θ2)
3 if Y ∗it ∈ [θ2, θ3)
4 if Y ∗it ∈ [θ3, θ4)
5 if Y ∗it ∈ [θ4,∞)
(5.2)
where the indicator i relates to a single tranche and t to a time period (here
quarter) and Rit takes the following characteristics j = 1, 2, ..., J . αt describes
the time-specic dierence of a rating standard to the reference period. Xit
is a vector of explanatory control variables related to the tranche and/or time
and β is the vector of slope coecients. θ1−θ4, are thresholds or cut-o points.
εit is a random noise variable with a standard normal distribution function.
Y ∗it may be interpreted as a latent continuous risk assessment by the CRA
such as the perceived attachment likelihood of losses,6 or expectation of losses.7
The continuous risk assessment by the CRA is not observable. Changes in the
5 Rösch & Scheule (2012) show that ratings may be linked to the probability of attachment
of losses which is a metric variable.
6 The CRA Standard and Poor's and Fitch apply such a methodology, (compare Standard
& Poor's 2005, Fitch Ratings 2006).
7 The CRAMoody's applies such a methodology (compare Moody's Investors Service 2006).
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intercept over time may reect changes in standards applied by CRAs when
rating securitizations. A lower αt than αt−1 implies a worse rating for a tranche
with the same vector of explanatory variables in the year t as the cut-o points
θ1 − θ4 remain the same for each year. Note, that we set the intercept for the
rst quarter of our panel to zero thus the rating standard of the rst quarter
of the panel can be regarded as the benchmark value for the remaining T-1
intercepts. Changes in the intercepts can be interpreted as changes in the
rating standards relative to the benchmark quarter.
We specify the link between Y ∗it and the observable ordinal rating by es-
timating the thresholds for Y ∗it with which the CRA assigns its rating. The
probability that the value of Y ∗it is in between the two thresholds is dened
as the dierence of the values of the distribution functions at the respective









Φ(θj − αt − β′Xit)− Φ(θj−1 − αt − β′Xit)
]Ritj (5.3)
where Ritj is an indicator variable.
Ritj =
1, if Rit = j0, else (5.4)
If we apply this general expression to our rating categories (j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
we have to take into consideration that the rst interval starts at −∞ (θ0 =
−∞). The respective value of the distribution function is zero. The last
interval ranges to +∞ (θ5 = +∞). The respective value of the distribution
function is one. The general log likelihood function corresponding to Equation










(θj − αt − β′Xit)− Φ(θj−1 − αt − β′Xit)
]
(5.5)




P(Rit = j|Xit, γ) =

P(αt + β′Xit + εit < θ1|γ) if j = 1
P(θj−1 ≤ αt + β′Xit + εit < θj|γ) if j = 2, 3, 4
P(θ4 ≤ αt + β′Xit + εit|γ) if j = 5
(5.6)
γ is dened by a set of parameter estimates including the maximum likeli-
hood estimates for β and θ as well as the estimates for the dierent αts. In
this model setup, the intercepts may vary over time while the slope coecients
remain the same for each quarter. By applying Equation 5.6 we obtain the
most probable rating category j for a tranche subject to the set of parameter
estimates γ.
In the empirical part, we compare two models: i) a model in which every
tranche observation is equally weighted and ii) a model in which the tranches
and their ratings are weighted by the size of exposure.
In order to test the Investor Awareness Hypothesis (H2) we explain the
yield spreads at origination (YSO) (respectively yield spreads at observation
(YSOBS)) by the actual rating and closing quarter (CQ): in the instance that
investors do not realize rating standard changes, closing quarters (or rating
quarters (RQ)) should not be signicant. The regression model for H2a is:
Y SOit = δ0 + δ1tCQ+ δ2Rit + εit (5.7)
The aim of the research is to reject the formulated null hypotheses. Sig-
nicant information of ratings implies that ratings at origination and during
monitoring years are informative. An increase of δ1t over time, which indicates
a rejection of the null, implies that rating standards have deteriorated over
time. A signicant link between CQ and the yield spreads of the respective
period, which indicate a rejection of the null, implies that investors have real-
ized that CRAs rating standards for mortgage-backed securities at origination
(H2a) and during monitoring years (H2b) have changed over time.
We further examine whether investors incorporate their knowledge about
changes in rating standards into tranche yield spreads. In the case that in-
vestors believe that the change in rating standards are justied due to a change
in the economic climate (e.g., increased risk) they should not oset the CRAs
tightening because the tranches need to maintain a better risk prole today
22
5.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
in order to achieve the same rating as in earlier years. In contrast, if the in-
vestors perceive that the tightening in rating standards is not justied, they
may have an incentive to oset the tighter standards. Consequently, the aver-
age spreads for a given rating category should decrease when investors perceive
tighter ratings which are not justied by an increase of risk. Or vice versa,
the average spreads should increase when investors perceive looser ratings not
justied by a decrease in risk. We use our quarterly intercepts (QI) from the
ordered probit analysis as proxy for the rating standard and test whether there
is a relation between the rating standards and the mean yield spreads of the
respective time period t. We regress the mean yield spreads per quarter for
the four dierent rating categories (RC) (1:Aaa, 2:Aa1-Aa3, 3:A1-A3, 4:Baa
and worse) on the quarterly intercepts and additional controls:




1 QIt + η
RC
2 GDPGROWt + εt (5.8)
Note that the number of observations amounts to 28 due to the fact that
rating standards are available on a quarterly basis. We conduct the regressions
for a Panel A reporting level regressions and for a Panel B reporting change
regressions.
5.3.2 Control Variables
In this section we introduce the explanatory variables which we use in our
model as drivers of impairment risk of mortgage-backed securities. The vari-
ables relate to the risk of the underlying mortgage pool, to the securitization
characteristics and to features of credit enhancement. Controlling for this
information is important as Keys et al. (2010) nd dierences in credit risk
between securitized and unsecuritized mortgage loans. We then analyze the
degree with which CRAs' ratings reect those risk drivers to be able to assess
the accuracy and therefore the standard of ratings.
With regard to mortgage pool risk, the control variables are: loan-to-value
ratio (LTV), Non-recourse State (NRC), Fair Isaac Corporation credit score
(FICO), owner occupancy (OOC), limited documentation (LIMDOC).8
The LTV ratio is dened as the ratio of total loan amount and the market
8 Note that all variables are averages over the underlying mortgage portfolio.
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value of the collateral (real estate) at origination.
The non-recourse State variable is a measure for strategic default dened
as the fraction of mortgage loans in the underlying pool where the lender is
not allowed to pursue anything other than the collateral. The recent nancial
crisis has shown that mortgage borrowers have an incentive to strategically
default on their mortgages if the loan-to-value ratio exceeds one (i.e., equity is
negative). In the presence of transaction costs this threshold may be less clear
but the general hypothesis that mortgage borrowers are more likely to default
the more loan values rise above the underlying real estate values remains valid.
The FICO score is a consumer credit score evaluating the borrower risk. It is
a well-known and broadly used credit score in the US. The score is determined
by a number (between 0 and 1000), which represents the creditworthiness of a
borrower. Borrowers with higher FICO scores may obtain better interest rates
on mortgages as well as higher credit limits.
Owner occupancy denes the fraction of mortgage loans in the underlying
pool where the purpose of the borrower is owner-occupancy (no investment
purpose). Limited documentation is the percentage of loans with only low
or no-documentation records. Due to the limited documentation of the per-
formance history it becomes more dicult for rating agencies to assign an
adequate rating. In particular, for these loan types, the information is mainly
based on borrowers' reports rather than veriable information from third par-
ties. Accordingly, LIMDOC mortgages are associated with higher risk levels.
However, they enjoyed a great popularity prior to the GFC.
Regarding the securitization characteristics we include the following vari-
ables in our model: subordination (SUB), thickness (THICK), log balance
(LB) and multiple CRAs (MCRA).
Subordination indicates the level of protection. Losses from the underly-
ing pool are absorbed following the seniority level of the tranches. Realized
losses aect the most junior tranche rst (also called First Loss Piece or eq-
uity tranche) then the mezzanine tranche and at last the most senior tranches.
Therefore, the subordinated tranches are protective layers for the most senior
tranches. Subordination levels are usually set to achieve a target rating for
the specic tranche. Ceteris paribus, a higher level of subordination indicates
that the rating is more conservative. The thickness of a tranche is dened
as the dierence between the upper and lower attachment level (in percent).
Log balance represents the logarithmized value of the total issuance volume.
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Multiple CRA is a dummy variable indicating whether a tranche is rated by
more than one CRA.
As credit enhancement features we include the following variables: cenh-
insurance (CENHI) and cenh-cross (CENHC). Then cenh-insurance is a dummy
variable specifying whether a supplementary insurance is in place or not. Cenh-
cross is also a dummy variable indicating whether the securitization is cross-
collateralized. Credit enhancement variables are limiting credit risk for the
investor and enhance the credit rating for asset-backed securities.
In the case of H1b, we take into account that the collateral (real estate)
values may have changed. We follow Demyanyk et al. (2011) and construct
for every period an adjusted LTV ratio which accounts for changes in the out-
standing loan amount under the assumption of a xed-rate mortgage (FRM):
















with 0 as the MBS origination date, t the observation date and T the loan
maturity date. The loan maturity date is approximated by the median matu-
rity of the respective loan portfolio. r0 is the interest rate at origination and
will be later approximated by the federal funds rate.10
CV Rt is the collateral value ratio of current to origination real estate value





The S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Indices measure changes in the total value
of residential real estate in 20 metropolitan regions of the US. The SPCS10 is
a composite index of the 10 major US metropolitan statistical areas.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the development of the major explanatory vari-
ables by rating category for the given time period and the two samples HEL
9 Note that by including PVR we extend the approach by Demyanyk et al. (2011) by
accounting for the loan amortization.
10 Note that the mortgage rate which may be modeled by the federal funds rate plus a
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Aaa Aa A Baa and worse
Notes: The gure presents the descriptive statistics for our six major explanatory variables derived from our
panel dataset over the time period between 2001 Q1-2007 Q4 for the HEL sample. The development of each
variable is shown for four aggregated rating categories.
Figure 5.1 shows that the HEL subordination levels increase over time for all
rating categories. As an example, for the Aaa-tranche the mean subordination
level rises from 13.64% in 2001 up to 30.46% in 2007. RMBS subordination
levels are in general lower than for HEL where an increase can only be ob-
served for the Aaa-rated tranches. As anticipated, LTV ratios for HEL are
on a higher level for all rating categories, however RMBS LTV ratios steadily
mount over time approximating the HEL levels. As expected, FICO scores
for RMBS are on average higher compared to HEL FICO scores, but we can
observe a decreasing trend over time for the RMBS sample. Regarding mort-
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Notes: The gure presents the descriptive statistics for our six major explanatory variables derived from our
panel dataset over the time period between 2002 Q2-2007 Q3 for the RMBS sample. The development of




5.4.1 Rating Standards at Origination (H1a) and during
Monitoring Years (H1b)
The coecient estimates for our control variables related to Hypotheses H1a
are presented in Table 5.2 for HEL (Panel A) as well as for RMBS (Panel
B). For both samples, the coecients are estimated for four dierent sets of
explanatory variables.11 Securitizations in general include multiple tranches
with dierent ratings. As a matter of fact, there are several tranches which
are part of the same deal. In order to accommodate this structure we calculate
clustered standard errors which are also provided in Table 5.2.
The coecient estimates of almost all explanatory variables are statisti-
cally signicant for both samples. Moreover, almost all variables have the
expected signs, e.g., tranches related to higher credit scores (FICO) are asso-
ciated with better ratings, tranches related to higher loan-to-value ratios are
associated with worse ratings and tranches with higher levels of subordination
are associated with better ratings. The same is also observable for the credit
enhancement features `additional insurance' and `cross-collateralization'. The
Non-recourse State variable is signicant for the dierent sets and for both
samples indicating that a higher fraction of non recourse borrowers in the un-
derlying pool is associated with a higher risk and respectively with a worse
rating. In contrast, the LIMDOC variable has no explanatory signicance at
all. Note that the results displayed in Table 5.2 are based on the assumption
that every tranche observation is equally-weighted. The model in which the
tranches and their ratings are weighted by the size of exposure (thickness of
tranche) delivers comparable results and therefore are not presented here.
In Figure 5.3 we show the development of rating standards at origination
and at observation represented by pattern of quarterly intercepts as estimated
in our ordered probit model for the HEL and the RMBS sample. The quarterly
intercepts are displayed for our dierent sets of control variables (Model 1 -
Model 3).12 In the case of HEL at origination a steady downward trend of
intercepts is illustrated during the entire period between (2001 Q1 - 2007 Q4)
11 Note that the incorporation of two further explanatory variables in our Model 3 reduces
the number of observations due to missing values. However, the size of the remaining
data set is sucient to deliver reliable results.
12 We refer to Model 4 in this table later in this paper in Section 5.5.3.
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Table 5.2: Estimates for Hypotheses H1a
Panel A: HEL
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Threshold -14.3241 *** 1.4954 -14.9668 *** 1.6769 -17.0333 *** 2.3851 -14.9346 *** 1.7013
Threshold -13.2969 *** 1.5063 -13.7829 *** 1.6954 -15.8928 *** 2.4146 -13.7492 *** 1.721
Threshold -12.2422 *** 1.5119 -12.6156 *** 1.7029 -14.7483 *** 2.4301 -12.579 *** 1.7294
Threshold -10.6377 *** 1.5132 -10.9063 *** 1.7038 -13.0319 *** 2.4347 -10.8747 *** 1.7299
SUB orig 21.8935 *** 0.9141 24.7573 *** 0.9706 24.2128 *** 1.0726 24.7482 *** 0.9694
LTV orig -1.6492 *** 0.5774 -1.4733 *** 0.5663 -1.5245 ** 0.624 -1.4716 *** 0.5675
FICO 0.0104 *** 0.0017 0.0096 *** 0.0019 0.0104 *** 0.0023 0.0096 *** 0.002
NRC -1.1996 *** 0.2106 -0.9247 *** 0.2245 -1.1675 *** 0.2165 -0.9199 *** 0.2225
LB 0.4081 *** 0.0502 0.3668 *** 0.0539 0.4119 *** 0.0601 0.3666 *** 0.0539
MCRA 0.0134 0.0781 0.1236 0.0891 0.0112 0.0783
CENHI 2.0556 *** 0.3067 2.0671 *** 0.3256 2.0524 *** 0.3059
CENHC 0.4447 *** 0.0768 0.503 *** 0.0811 0.4447 *** 0.0768
OOC 0.008 0.0076
LIMDOC -0.0008 0.0015
FAILBETA -0.0107 *** 0.017
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 50,272 50,272 40,856 50,272
adj. R2 0.6901 0.7342 0.7288 0.7351
Panel B: RMBS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Threshold -4.8595 * 2.5204 -4.9348 ** 2.4888 -5.9914 ** 2.3231 -4.5406 * 2.3372
Threshold -4.0254 2.5139 -4.0966 * 2.4822 -5.0787 ** 2.3167 -3.6722 2.3302
Threshold -3.3575 2.5055 -3.4258 2.4738 -4.3529 * 2.3084 -2.9481 2.3208
Threshold -2.355 2.4838 -2.4155 2.4519 -3.3128 2.2919 -1.8388 2.2994
Threshold -1.7517 2.4675 -1.8034 2.4351 -2.6953 2.2827 -1.1386 2.2867
SUB orig 51.0008 *** 2.2046 50.5265 *** 2.2188 53.6077 *** 2.5219 47.7286 *** 2.5042
LTV orig -5.5048 *** 0.4606 -5.4554 *** 0.4423 -5.1013 *** 0.4228 -5.3337 *** 0.4181
FICO 0.0115 *** 0.003 0.0115 *** 0.0029 0.0094 *** 0.0027 0.0111 *** 0.0027
NRC -1.0054 *** 0.1419 -1.0055 *** 0.142 -1.2051 *** 0.1764 -0.9531 *** 0.1406
LB -0.0588 0.0401 -0.0692 * 0.0395 -0.0243 0.0447 -0.0683 * 0.0392
MCRA 0.2766 *** 0.0856 0.1562 0.0994 0.2812 *** 0.0854
CENHI 0.3138 0.341 0.1809 0.3938 0.3289 0.3278
CENHC 0.1007 * 0.0563 0.102 * 0.0565 0.0911 * 0.0547
OOC 0.0217 *** 0.0026
LIMDOC -0.0036 *** 0.0014
FAILBETA -0.0135 *** 0.0033
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 101,722 101,722 82,340 101,722
adj. R2 0.5312 0.5344 0.5680 0.5576
Notes: The table shows the estimation results for the ordered probit model for the HEL sample (Panel A)
and the RMBS sample (Panel B) at origination. For both panels the coecient estimates are presented for
four dierent sets of explanatory variables (Model 1-4). Note that the results presented here are based on
the assumption that each tranche observation is equally weighted. Standard errors account for the clustered
structure of the dataset where a transaction/deal generally comprises multiple tranches. Thus, the standard
errors are robust to within cluster correlation. The signicance is indicated as follows: ***: signicant at
1%, **:signicant at 5%, *:signicant at 10%.
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for each model. Almost all quarterly intercepts are statistically signicant at
the 1%-level. The decreasing trend in the intercept values accommodates the
application of more stringent rating standards over time, given the identied
explanatory variables in our analysis.
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RMBS - at observation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Notes: The gure shows the estimated intercepts of the ordered probit model plotted over time for HEL
and RMBS at origination as well as at observation. Note that the intercept of the rst quarter is set to
zero. The downward trend of quarterly intercepts for the HEL sample implies tighter ratings standards. For
RMBS the variations of quarterly intercepts are not signicant.
In Figure 5.3 we also display the intercept development for HEL rating
standards at observation. The trend of intercepts indicates again that rating
agencies tightened their rating standards for monitoring years over the time
period 2001 Q1 - 2009 Q4. Most intercepts are signicant at the 1% level.
The RMBS results do not exhibit signicant variations of quarterly inter-
cepts at origination or at observation, implying that rating agencies maintained
rather stable rating standards over time.
In order to evaluate the adequacy of the applied probit model we compare
actual versus predicted ratings. The results are presented in the table below.
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Table 5.3: Goodnesss of Fit of the Probit Model
Predicted Rating
Actual Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba/B Total
Aaa 18,064 1,961 623 87 4 20,739
Aa 3,428 4,349 1,507 142 12 9,438
A 294 1,107 4,783 2,478 24 8,686
Baa 107 244 1,500 7,218 182 9,251
Ba/B 8 7 96 1,921 126 2,158
Total Predicted 21,901 7,668 8,509 11,846 348 50,272
Notes: The table presents the actual ratings based on our dataset in comparison to the predicted ratings
resulting from the mapping of the ordered probit model. The most probable rating is within plus or minus
one rating category of the actual rating for most tranches. Note that the goodness of t is measured for the
HEL sample at origination according to Model 2.
The gures in Table 5.3 show that most of the predicted ratings deviate by
only one rating category which underlines the explanatory power of the used
model. However, the model underpredicts the lowest rating category.
5.4.2 Investors' Awareness at Origination (H2a) and dur-
ing Monitoring Years (H2b)
The further goal of this paper is to test whether investors perceive a change in
rating standards at origination and during monitoring years using the model
according to Equation 5.7. The results of our panel regressions are presented
in Table 5.4.
We nd that ratings for HEL at origination have an inuence on the yield
spreads which is signicant at the 1%-level. Better ratings imply lower yield
spreads. We also nd that closing has a signicant inuence on the yield
spreads for each observation quarter. The decrease of the quarterly coecients
over time indicates the rejection of our hypotheses H2a and implies that the
rating standards have tightened over time.
Regarding our second case at observation we also observe that ratings have
a signicant inuence on the yield spreads at the 1%-level. However better
ratings now imply higher yield spreads which is owed to the extreme increase
of yield spreads from 2007 onwards right for the better rating categories.13
13 If we consider only the period before 2008, we also observe for the monitoring case that
better ratings imply lower yield spreads.
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Table 5.4: Investor's Awareness
H2a H2b
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept -4.1087 *** 0.0144 Intercept -3.2453 *** 0.0535
Rating 0.1877 *** 0.0042 Rating -0.1124 *** 0.006
2002 Q1 0.5081 *** 0.0392 2002 Q1 0.4107 *** 0.1592
2002 Q2 0.4106 *** 0.0267 2002 Q2 0.4094 ** 0.1622
2002 Q3 0.3203 *** 0.0289 2002 Q3 0.4094 ** 0.1622
2002 Q4 0.1327 *** 0.0401 2002 Q4 0.3978 ** 0.1671
2003 Q1 0.2807 *** 0.0372 2003 Q1 0.4841 *** 0.1262
2003 Q2 0.2011 *** 0.0271 2003 Q2 0.5151 *** 0.1295
2003 Q3 0.1042 *** 0.0276 2003 Q3 0.5246 *** 0.1331
2003 Q4 0.295 *** 0.0239 2003 Q4 0.4753 *** 0.1371
2004 Q1 0.0629 ** 0.0264 2004 Q1 -0.1943 ** 0.0895
2004 Q2 0.0484 ** 0.0215 2004 Q2 -0.2142 ** 0.0901
2004 Q3 0.2062 *** 0.0216 2004 Q3 -0.2323 ** 0.0908
2004 Q4 0.0202 0.0268 2004 Q4 -0.2019 ** 0.0918
2005 Q1 -0.1929 *** 0.0437 2005 Q1 -0.766 *** 0.0826
2005 Q2 -0.2743 *** 0.0255 2005 Q2 -0.7764 *** 0.0829
2005 Q3 -0.4464 *** 0.0239 2005 Q3 -0.7563 *** 0.0836
2005 Q4 -0.6569 *** 0.0311 2005 Q4 -0.7468 *** 0.0847
2006 Q1 -0.846 *** 0.0325 2006 Q1 -0.4892 *** 0.0947
2006 Q2 -0.7885 *** 0.0394 2006 Q2 -0.515 *** 0.095
2006 Q3 -0.7916 *** 0.0229 2006 Q3 -0.4972 *** 0.097
2006 Q4 -0.8522 *** 0.0364 2006 Q4 -0.495 *** 0.0996
2007 Q1 -0.8394 *** 0.0451 2007 Q1 -0.6926 *** 0.0629
2007 Q2 -0.6587 *** 0.0383 2007 Q2 -0.6925 *** 0.0631
2007 Q3 -0.4841 *** 0.0467 2007 Q3 -0.689 *** 0.0636
2007 Q4 -0.5641 *** 0.0387 2007 Q4 -0.703 *** 0.0645
2008 Q1 0.662 *** 0.0554
2008 Q2 0.714 *** 0.0556
2008 Q3 0.7673 *** 0.0577
2008 Q4 0.7831 *** 0.0579
2009 Q1 2.2309 *** 0.0584
2009 Q2 1.9517 *** 0.0772
2009 Q3 1.9297 *** 0.0831
2009 Q4 1.9316 *** 0.0852
N 6,401 N 19,528
adj. R2 0.5529 adj. R2 0.4221
Notes: The table shows the results of our panel regressions according to Equation (5.7) for the HEL sample
at origination (H2a) and at observation (H2b). The signicance is indicated as follows: ***: signicant at
1%, **:signicant at 5%, *:signicant at 10%.
32
5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We also nd a signicant link between the quarterly coecients and the yield
spreads at observation. Hence, investors do perceive changes in rating stan-
dards and hypothesis H2b is also rejected.
5.4.3 Yield Spread Pricing
The paper also examines whether a relationship between rating standards and
yield spread pricing exists according to Equation (5.8). The mean yield spreads
by rating category at origination and at observation are presented in Figure
5.4 over time for the HEL sample.
Figure 5.4: Development of the Yield Spread at Origination and Observation
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Aaa Aa A Baa and worse
Notes: The gure shows the development of mean yield spreads per rating category over time for the HEL
sample at origination and at observation. Mean yield spreads are in general higher for riskier investments.
The steady downward trend end in 2007 followed by a sharp increase of basispoints for all rating categories.
The gure shows that mean yield spreads are higher for riskier investments.
Between 2002 and 2007 the mean yield spreads for all rating categories con-
tinuously declined by approximately 200 basispoints. Around 2006/2007 the
level of yield spreads for the riskiest rating category is even lower than the
level of yield spreads for the least risky rating category at the beginning of our
observation period. In 2007, we observe an abrupt increase for all investment
categories clearly indicating the unexpected macroeconomic shock.
The regression results are shown in Table 5.5 displaying the time-series re-
gressions of mean yield spreads on rating standards and GDP growth as an
additional control variable. Panel A displays level regressions, Panel B change
regressions. The dierent columns exhibit the regression for the dierent rating
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categories. Rating standards are approximated by estimates of quarterly in-
tercepts for the HEL sample at origination using Model 2 illustrated in Figure
5.3.
Table 5.5: Yield Spread Regressions
Panel A: HEL - Level Regressions
Aaa Aa1-Aa3 A1-A3 Baa and worse
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept -3.7507 *** 0.2226 -3.4281*** 0.2546 -3.2637 *** 0.2068 -3.2141 *** 0.1978
QI 0.2229 ** 0.0854 0.2718 *** 0.0853 0.2620 *** 0.0693 0.2236 *** 0.0663
GDPGROW -0.1397 0.1697 -0.1103 0.1874 -0.1225 0.1523 -0.1004 0.1456
N 28 28 28 28
adj. R2 0.2463 0.3077 0.3877 0.3345
Panel B: HEL - Change Regressions
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept -0.0588 * 0.0307 -0.0579 0.0400 -0.0521 0.0363 -0.0304 0.0506
QI 0.0262 ** 0.0109 0.0239 * 0.0121 0.0152 0.011 0.0122 0.0153
GDPGROW 0.0573 ** 0.0229 0.0559 * 0.0287 0.0482 * 0.026 0.0315 0.0363
N 27 27 27 27
adj. R2 0.3134 0.2528 0.1911 0.0576
Notes: The Table displays the results of our time-series regressions according to Equation (5.8) for the HEL
sample. We regress the mean yield spreads per quarter for the four dierent rating categories (RC) (1:Aaa,
2:Aa1-Aa3, 3:A1-A3, 4:Baa and worse) on the rating standards and GDP growth. Note that the rating
standards are approximated by estimates of the quarterly intercepts for the HEL sample at origination
adopted from Model 2. Panel A reports level regressions, Panel B change regressions. The signicance is
indicated as follows: ***: signicant at 1%, **:signicant at 5%, *:signicant at 10%.
Note that the quarterly intercept coecients are positively related to av-
erage yield spreads of tranches for each rating category. The QI variable is
signicant for rating category Aaa at the 5%-level and for the other rating
categories (Aa1-Aa3, A1-A3, Baa and worse) at the 1%-level. This implies
that increasing QIs (looser rating standards) are associated with higher yield
spreads for a given rating category. Vice versa, decreasing QIs (tighter rat-
ing standards) imply lower yield spreads. Overall the results suggest that
the decrease in yield spreads (Figure 5.4) may be explained by  at least to
some extent  pricing adjustments from investors in response to the tighter
rating standards. Apparently, investors were not totally convinced that this
tightening was justied by a risk increase in the economy.
5.5 Robustness Checks
Basically there are three potential objections that could challenge our main
nding that rating standards for HEL tightened over time at origination and
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at observation. First, the generality of ndings. All results are subject to
the explanatory variables used in the analysis. We address this criticism by
using dierent sets of control variables and by an additional examination of
further potential control variables. For the reliability of our model it is quite
important that the predicted signs of explanatory variables are robust. In
order to verify whether our predicted signs can be regarded as sustainable, we
conduct a separate ordered probit analysis for each quarter of the panel to
identify actual deviations. Second, the dynamics we found in our analysis may
hold for Moody's but not for other rating agencies. This concern is addressed
by a further analysis estimating the key models for Standard and Poor's ratings
at origination. Third, the tightening of rating standards may be a reection
of a change in the systematic risk rather than a change in the CRAs' risk
perception of securitized nancial instruments. We address this argument by
adding a specic control variable of systematic risk to our model.
5.5.1 Generality of Findings
Table 5.2 shows that our results are robust for a variation of dierent explana-
tory variables according to Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. In addition, Figure
5.3 shows that the dierent models generate only minor changes in the plots of
quarterly intercepts. Moreover, we have considered several further variables,
one related to the risk prole of tranches (tranche default) and the others re-
lated to the macroeconomy such as the consumer price index (cpi), the SPCS10
index (lagged and anticipated), the GDP growth rate and the unemployment
rate. The result is the same if we control for outcome of risk as tranche de-
fault within a year from origination. As macroeconomic variables are time
dependent the concept of using time dummies is not applicable anymore. We
substitute the time dummies by a metric variable where the time is linearly
approximated (rst quarter receives the value of 1, second quarter value of 2,
etc.). The coecient of our new time variable shows the expected negative sign
and is signicant at the 1% level. An increase in time is associated with lower
ratings and respectively tighter rating standards. The inclusion of the macroe-
conomic variables has hardly any impact on the signs and the signicance of
the basic set of control variables. We nd that the cpi and the anticipated
SPCS10 index have signicant explanatory power for the rating assignment.
A rise in cpi is associated with worse ratings and an anticipated rise in the
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SPCS10 index is also associated with a worse rating. We conclude that our
results are robust to further explanatory variables for the HEL sample.
In order to check the robustness of the predicted signs we re-estimate the
model for each quarter of the panel. The results are exhibited for HEL as well
as for RMBS for ratings at origination and ratings at observation in Table 5.6.
We present the signs of the signicant variables and the number of quarters
without any signicant deviation in relation to the total number of quarters.
Table 5.6: Ordered Probit Estimates for each Quarter of the Panel
At origination At observation
HEL RMBS HEL RMBS
Variable Pred. sign Total Pred. sign Total Variable Pred. sign Total Pred. sign Total
SUB + 28/28 + 23/23 SUB + 36/36 + 32/32
LTV orig - 23/28 - 23/23 LTV new - 27/36 - 26/32
FICO + 24/28 + 22/23 FICO + 36/36 + 32/32
LB + 23/28 / / LB at obs + 36/36 / /
NRC - 22/28 - 19/23 NRC - 35/36 - 31/32
MCRA / / + 19/23 MCRA + 36/36 + 32/32
CENHI + 27/28 / / CENHI + 36/36 / /
CENHC + 24/28 + 20/23 CENHC / / + 31/32
Notes: The table presents the results of our robustness check, analyzing deviations between the predicted
sign of the ordered probit model over the entire time period and the signs of the re-estimated model for
each quarter of the panel. The column `Total' displays the number of quarters without any deviation from
the predicted sign in relation to the total number of quarters. Results are presented for HEL and RMBS at
origination as well as at observation.
The number of deviations is quite small which further supports for the
robustness of our ndings.
5.5.2 Other Rating Agencies
A further criticism of the ndings of this paper could be that the ndings may
not be observable for other rating agencies. In order to address this criticism
we re-estimate the key models for the S&P ratings at origination for the HEL
sample to examine whether our ndings persist. As our number of rating
observations from CRA Fitch is limited, we check the consistency across the
two rating agencies Moody's and S&P's. In total we have more than 38,000
observations with ratings from both agencies Moody's and S&P's for the given
period and the HEL sample. The rating assignments of Moody's and S&P's
are deviating by 21.59%. In 89.40% of those cases Standard & Poor's provides
a better rating than Moody's. Note, that the majority of rating dierences
36
5.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
(67.95%) accounts for a single notch.
The results of the re-estimated model, exhibited in Table 5.7, clearly support
our original ndings.
Table 5.7: Estimates for Hypotheses H1a - S&P Ratings
Model 1 - S&P Model 2 - S&P Model 3 - S&P
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Threshold -14.3687 *** 1.7545 -14.5955 *** 1.9707 -16.8816 *** 2.8685
Threshold -13.1212 *** 1.7806 -13.2484 *** 2.009 -15.5676 *** 2.9119
Threshold -12.0936 *** 1.7882 -12.1697 *** 2.0198 -14.5031 *** 2.9246
Threshold -10.5049 *** 1.7853 -10.5319 *** 2.0201 -12.8305 *** 2.9233
SUB orig 21.2788 *** 0.9266 22.8076 *** 1.0611 22.3906 *** 1.0974
LTV orig -0.7543 0.6709 -0.8042 0.7256 -0.964 0.7714
FICO 0.0094 *** 0.0022 0.0086 *** 0.0026 0.0096 *** 0.003
NRC -0.9941 *** 0.2374 -0.8251 *** 0.2518 -1.1178 *** 0.2551
LB 0.4317 *** 0.0544 0.382 *** 0.0558 0.3805 *** 0.0646
CENHI 1.7287 *** 0.4003 1.7298 *** 0.4046
CENHC 0.3464 *** 0.0855 0.3955 *** 0.09
OOC 0.0226 *** 0.0092
LIMDOC 0.0026 0.0016
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 36,382 36,382 30,282
adj. R2 0.6819 0.7075 0.7038
Notes: The table shows the estimation results for the ordered probit model for S&P ratings at origina-
tion. The coecient estimates are presented for three dierent sets of explanatory variables (Model 1-3).
Note that the results presented here are based on the assumption that each tranche observation is equally
weighted. Standard errors account for the clustered structure of the dataset where a transaction/deal gen-
erally comprises multiple tranches. Thus, the standard errors are robust to within cluster correlation. The
signicance is indicated as follows: ***: signicant at 1%, **:signicant at 5%, *:signicant at 10%.
Almost all explanatory variables are signicant at the 1% level and show the
expected signs. The outcome is eective for all sets of explanatory variables
used in our basic analysis (Model 1 - Model 3). We also observe a down-
ward trend of quarterly intercepts (Figure 5.5) which is very close to the plot
generated by the Moody's ratings.
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 Rating Standard S&P 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Notes: The gure shows the estimated intercepts of the ordered probit model plotted over time for S&P
ratings at origination for our dierent sets of parameters (Model 1-Model 3). Note that the intercept of the
rst quarter is set to zero. The downward trend of quarterly intercepts implies tighter ratings standards.
5.5.3 Systematic Risk
In this section we deal with the concern that the results of the investigation
may be a mere reection of the economic climate. One could argue that the
cause for tighter rating standards is due to an increase of systematic risk during
the observation period. In order to verify this proposition, we add a control
variable as proxy for systematic risk to our model.
Following the approach of Hilscher & Wilson (2013) we measure systematic
risk as the sensitivity of the tranche's default probability (PD) to a common
factor. The authors show that the median default probability is a reliable
measure of common variation in default probabilities. Therefore, in a rst
step, we estimate the PDs of the tranches for our basic set of explanatory
variables using a probit model. Based on the individual PDs we determine the
median PD for each quarter of our panel. Then, using the following regression
model, we estimate the so-called `failure betas' as a proxy for systematic risk








t + εit (5.12)
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Our failure beta estimates are exhibited in Table 5.8 at origination for the
HEL as well as the RMBS sample.
Table 5.8: Failure Beta
Panel A: HEL
Rating Intercept FAILBETA SE R2
Aaa -0.001 0.5999 0.0217 0.0882
Aa 0.005 0.9572 0.0228 0.1884
A 0.0174 1.6419 0.0332 0.2495
Baa 0.0528 3.2618 0.0603 0.2744
Ba and worse 0.1946 4.2108 0.0874 0.1555
Panel B: RMBS
Aaa 0.0013 0.2345 0.0033 0.0201
Aa 0.0052 0.4471 0.0036 0.0552
A 0.0174 1.4912 0.011 0.0767
Baa 0.0478 3.4859 0.0253 0.0728
Ba 0.0916 8.4088 0.0558 0.0903
B and worse 0.1647 14.4555 0.0872 0.0783
Notes: The table shows the results of the `failure beta' estimates according to Equation (5.12) at origination
for HEL and RMBS per rating category across all quarters of the panel.
In fact, our estimates of failure beta increase with worsening rating cate-
gories for ratings at origination. In principle, this is also true for ratings at
observation. The chosen notication in Table 5.8 shows the average failure
betas per rating grade across all quarters of the panel.
As CRAs could have only measured systematic risk with past information,
failure betas enter the analysis which are estimated using past data only (ex-
ante perspective). For our analysis we include failure beta (FAILBETA) esti-
mates of the previous year per rating category and per year as control variable
for systematic risk. The results are shown as Model 4 in Table 5.2. The gures
demonstrate that the control variable `failure beta' has a signicant inuence
on the rating assignment. As expected, we observe a negative sign meaning
that higher systematic risk is associated with worse ratings.14
Regarding the quarterly intercepts we refer to Figure 5.3 which shows that
the inclusion of the control variable for systematic risk hardly changes devel-
opment of the curve. This suggests that the results are robust to systematic
risk.
14 Note, that we also estimated failure betas per rating category and year with data up to




Rating agencies are broadly criticized for relaxing or loosening rating standards
for mortgage-backed securities prior to the GFC. In this paper we examine the
dynamics in rating standards for HEL and RMBS for the period between 2001
and 2007/2009. We nd no evidence which supports the criticism of relaxing
or loosening standard either for HEL or for RMBS. In contrast, the results
suggest, that rating standards for HEL have been tightened which is in line
with the statement of major representatives from the leading rating agencies.
This result may appear puzzling in light of the tremendous losses coming in
particular from structured nancial instruments like mortgage-backed securi-
ties. Moreover, MBS for subprime borrowers are regarded as a major driver of
the GFC.
However, the cause for our ndings is the risk prole of the securitized
tranches. Originators of securitizations were forced over time to improve the
risk prole of the tranches in order to attain the same rating. Apparently, these
corrections may be seen as insucient. Moreover, part of the corrections have
been oset by price adjustments of the investors. These observations suggest,
that the corrections of the rating agencies could have been more drastic or
inserted at an earlier point in time.
The fact that rating agencies did not fully capture the inherent risk of
structured products has already been admitted in ocial statements of the
agencies. Therefore, CRAs aim at restoring the condence in their structured
nance ratings by changing and improving their rating assignments. In 2009,
Moody's Investors Service (2009b) published their newly requested data elds
including important loan information that was thus far not considered when
assigning ratings in order to improve their RMBS rating quality. Also Standard
and Poor's (2009) announced changes in their calibration standard for US
RMBS ratings referring to the experiences of the Great Depression.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and a Brief Outlook to
Current Developments
In this cumulative thesis the results are summarized at the end of each sin-
gle chapter. As a major general conclusion it is shown that capital charges
for securitized products based on current regulatory rules may be inadequate
due to i) high dependency of securitized tranches on the state of economy
ii) negligence of possible cyclical eects in regulatory capital requirements for
securitizations iii) insucient inclusion of systematic risk in the regulatory
approaches iv) over-reliance on external ratings and v) too low risk weights
for highly-rated, high-issuance-volume tranches. Moreover, the results from
our investigation of time-series dynamics for MBS suggest that rating agencies
may have diculties in adjusting their standards contemporarily to changes
in the economic conditions.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has conducted a broad review
to the securitization framework and published a rst consultative document
submitting a comprehensive set revisions by December 2012 and a second one
by December 2013 (compare Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012),
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013a)). In this concluding chap-
ter the latest proposed revisions to the securitization framework are briey
described and discussed with regard to the general conclusion of this cumula-
tive thesis.
The rationale behind the proposed revised framework is explained by three
major shortcomings within the current securitization rules:
1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision conrms that the risk
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assessments of CRAs were too optimistic for certain securitized assets.
Hence decient rating grades were determining regulatory capital re-
quirements as the banks were obliged to apply the RBA for securitized
transactions when an external (or inferred) rating was available.
2. The Committee also found that risk weights for highly-rated securitiza-
tion tranches were too low whereas risk weights for low-rated tranches
were too high.
3. Finally, the Committee identied procyclical issues in the securitization
framework due to signicant increases in capital requirements resulting
from i) high absolute risk weight dierences (RBA) and ii) strong leaps
in capital charges triggered by even small changes in the qualities of the
reference pool for unrated exposures (SFA) so called cli-eects.
The rating issue has been broadly discussed in this thesis (see Chapter
3, 4 and 5). The matter of too low, respectively too high risk weights, has
been shown in Chapter 4 where it is demonstrated that the incorporation of
systematic risk suggests much higher risk weights for higher rated-tranches
and much lower risk weights for lower-rated tranches. Regarding the so called
cli-eects, Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4 illustrates the steps of capital requirements
based on the current risk weights. At the same time it is shown in Table 4.4
and Table 4.5 in Chapter 4 that the cli-eects are mitigated as a consequence
of our proposed new implied risk weights which increase more continuously.
The smoothed structure of risk weights might also contribute to a mitigation
of capital volatility along the business cycle (see Chapter 3).
One major element of the enhanced framework proposal is a new hierar-
chy of the set of modied and new approaches in assigning capital to securi-
tized products. In the rst consultative document (Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2012)) the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision intro-
duces a modied version of the SFA (Modied Supervisory Formula Approach
(MSFA)) and a revised RBA (Revised Ratings-based Approach (RRBA)) (see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013b) and Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2013c)). Regarding the change in the hierarchy, two al-
ternatives are submitted for discussion both showing a much more dominant
position of the MSFA. Obviously the expressed aim in the proposals submitted
by the Basel Committee is to move away from CRA ratings as the prevailing
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basis for capital requirement determination. The modications of the existing
SFA and RBA approaches have been engineered in a way to support the new
levels of the hierarchy where the RRBA usually requires higher capital charges
compared to the MSFA.
Calibrating the new risk weights in the revised RBA, the proposal mainly
incorporates two new risk drivers: maturity of the tranches and thickness of
non-senior tranches. In general, all highly-rated tranches (AAA - BBB-) ex-
hibit higher risk weights than under the current RBA and the risk-weight oor
has been set to 20% which harmonizes the RRBA with the Standardized Ap-
proach (SA). Furthermore, the lower-rated tranches exhibit lower risk weights
than under the current RBA and a 100% coverage is required only for tranches
below rating grade CCC- (currently already below rating grade BB-). The risk
weights generated in our proposal (Chapter 4) are following the same rationale.
Regarding the modications of the SFA, the Committee essentially proposes
to build in maturity eects at the level of individual tranches and further
parameter adjustments in order to mitigate the above mentioned cli-eects.
Furthermore, the Committee introduces new approaches such as a Simpli-
ed Supervisory Formula Approach (SSFA), a concentration ratio approach in
particular for resecuritization exposures and other changes and clarications.
However, as a result from the Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) and the
comments from the banking industry, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision has submitted a revision of this document (see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2013a)). The approaches proposed in the rst docu-
ment were regarded as being too complex for implementation purposes as well
as for supervision requirements. Trying to achieve a reasonable balance be-
tween risk sensitivity and simplicity, the committee has decided to propose new
approaches being more simple and easier to apply. The Modied Supervisory
Formula Approach has been replaced by an Internal Ratings-based Approach
(IRBA) engineering a risk sensitivity similar to that of the former proposal.
Regarding the hierarchy, the IRBA is considered as the preferred approach to
be used by the banks. The committee proposes to replace the Revised Ratings-
based Approach (RRBA) by the External Ratings-based Approach (ERBA).
The changes in the ERBA delivers similar capital charges compared to the Re-
vised Ratings-based Approach (RRBA) introduced in the rst document with
some deviations. E.g., a risk weight oor of 15% (instead of 20%) is proposed
for all approaches. Nevertheless, also the new proposal follows in general the
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new calibration pattern as described in the rst consultative document.
Under the new approaches, `capital neutrality'15 may not be necessarily
provided for all securitizations due to the greater complexity of securitizations
compared to the underlying assets. This also indicates that the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision is preferring a conservative approach for the
enhanced securitization framework.
In summary, the revisions proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and presented in the consultative documents reect many aspects
which have been analyzed and discussed in this cumulative thesis. In par-
ticular, the suggestions may alleviate the impact from external credit ratings
due to the new hierarchy and mitigate procyclical eects in regulatory capital
for securitizations. As a consequence, the committee may achieve more pru-
dent capital requirements and thereby re-establish condence in securitization
markets.
15 Capital neurality is achieved if the total capital requirement before securitization is iden-
tical to the total capital requirement after securitization.
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